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ABSTRACT
Liveness tests are techniques employed by face recognition authentication systems, aiming at verifying that a live
face rather than a photo is standing in front of the system camera. In this paper, we study the resilience of a standard
liveness test under imposter photo attacks, under the additional assumption that the photos used in the attack may
have been processed by common image processing operations such as sharpening, smoothing and corruption with
salt and pepper noise. The results verify and quantify the claim that this type of liveness tests rely on the imposter
photo images being less sharp than live face images.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Compared to the other main biometric authentication
methods which are based on fingerprints or high reso-
lution iris images, face recognition has the unique char-
acteristic that it is based on data that can easily be found
in the public domain. For example, in many cases can
be very easy to obtain a photo of someone’s face, either
doing a quick online search or by logging into a social
network. As a result, face recognition based authen-
tication is particularly vulnerable to imposter attacks,
when, for example, an attacker holds someone’s photo
in front of the camera trying to gain access through the
face recognition system.
To counter such concerns, liveness tests are binary clas-
sification algorithms aiming at determining whether the
recognized face is a live face, or a photo or video played
in front of the system’s camera. Developing accurate
liveness tests is a challenging task and they often re-
quire use of specialized hardware, such as infrared cam-
eras. In [10] several commercial user authentication
systems that do not use additional hardware to support
liveness tests were evaluated and they were found vul-
nerable to even very crude imposter image attacks.
The research on liveness tests that do not rely on spe-
cialized hardware is motivated by the desire to have se-
cure face recognition based authentication on machines
of everyday use, such low end laptops and smartphones.
The current state of the art, such as the Tan et al. paper
[16], is based on machine learning algorithms trained
to distinguish between images of live faces taken by the
face recognition system and images of photos fed to the
system by the imposters. In particular, it has been estab-
lished that the different reflectance properties of these
two categories of can lead to the development of an ef-
fective liveness test.
In this paper we study the effect of image processing
operations applied on the imposter images on the per-
formance of a variant of the Tan et al. test based on
differences of Gaussians and sparse logistic regression.
As a possible explanation of why their algorithm is ef-
fective, Tan et al. observe that images of face photos
fed into the system by imposters tend to be smoother,
as they lack detail. The main contribution of our paper
is a verification and quantification of this claim by pro-
cessing the imposter images and measuring the effect
on the performance of their algorithm. As expected,
the sharpening of the imposter images reduced the ac-
curacy of the liveness test, while the smoothing of the
imposter images increased it.
The main limitation of our paper is that we process
the imposter images of an existing database (NUAA),
which are images of a photo of the subject, rather than
processing the photos of the subject and then taking
photos of them. While this approach allows for a better
quantitative understanding of the basic principle under-
lying the Tan et al. algorithm, we note that we have not
yet measured the effect of a direct attack consisting of
processing the photo of the subject and feeding it into
the system.
2 RELATEDWORK
As biometrics based security applications become in-
creasingly popular, the study of their vulnerabilities and
the development of countermeasures is becoming a re-
search topic of current interest. Attacks on face recog-
nition systems fall into two main categories; direct and
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indirect attacks. Direct attacks rely on the use of stolen
biometric data of some form; digital images displayed
on a screen, printed photos, or gummy fingerprints. Pan
et al. [11] classified direct attacks into three categories:
a photograph of the real user is used; a video; or a 3D
model. One particular strength of direct attacks is that
they do not require knowledge of the face recognition
system they attack.
Indirect attacks use algorithms to construct an input
face that will gain entry to the biometric security sys-
tem. They presuppose some knowledge of the attacked
system and a certain level of information leakage from
it. Martinez et al. [9] uses similarities scores assumed
to be outputted by the face recognition system and the
hill climbing technique to construct an image giving ac-
cess to the system. Galbally et al. [3] tested the vulner-
ability of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based
face recognition system against a Bayesian hill climb-
ing attack algorithm and reported a 85% success rate
for such attacks. In [5], two face recognition systems
using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and PCA, re-
spectively, were tested against a Hill Climbing indirect
attack and were both found vulnerable, with the GMM
system being nevertheless the more robust.
Liveness tests are binary classification algorithms de-
veloped as countermeasures to the imposter attacks to
distinguish between live faces and imposter images,
video or 3D models. Robust liveness tests that do not
require the use of any specialized hardware have been
developed based on the observation that the high fre-
quency components of the imposter images are weaker
than those of the live faces.
The algorithm in Tan et al. [16] we study in this pa-
per is based on this observation and will be discussed
in more detail in Section 3. Peixoto et al. [13] further
improved the Tan et al. algorithm by addressing limi-
tations related to bad illumination conditions. Another
anti-spoofing approach proposed by Komulainen et al.
[7] uses support vector machine classification of his-
tograms of gradient descriptors. Maatta et al. [8] uses
Local Binary Patterns to analyze the local texture of the
face and the resulting single feature histograms are clas-
sified with Support Vector Machines. Galbally et al. [4]
use image quality metrics and classify the lower quality
images as imposter.
Other approaches to rely on biometric motion analy-
sis, focusing on different types of motion such as: head
tilting [2], mouth movement [6] and eye-blinking [12].
Foreground and background motion correlation is used
in [1]. Finally, the accuracy rates of liveness tests can be
boosted with the use of specialized hardware. Socolin-
sky et al. [14] analyzed face thermograms acquired by
a thermal imaging camera, while Steiner et al. [15] re-
cently proposed a liveness test based on the analysis of
the spectral signatures in the infrared.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
In [16], Tan et al. proposed a series of liveness tests
where information sensitive to the reflectance proper-
ties of the scene is extracted from the image and it is
used to train a binary classifier so that it can distinguish
between images of live faces and images of photos of
faces. The variant we implemented extracts a differ-
ence of Gaussians from the image and uses it to train
a sparse logistic regression classifier. The implemen-
tation was done in Matlab and the SLEP package was
used for the sparse logistic regression.
Following the recommendation in [16], we smooth the
image using Gaussian filters with σ1 = 0.5 and σ2 = 1.0
and compute the difference of the two smoothed im-
ages. Regarding the machine learning part of the al-
gorithm, following the notation and parameter choices
in [16], we use the class labels {−1,1}, where -1 cor-
responds to client images and 1 to imposter images
and the conditional probability of the the imposter class
y= 1 is given by
Prob(y|x) = 1
1+ exp(−y(wT x+b) (1)
where x is the sample image, and w and b are the weight
vector and the intercept. To avoid overfitting, the values
of w and b are computed through the minimization of
the cost function
min
w,b
loss(w,b)+λ‖w‖1 (2)
where λ is a user defined constant favoring sparse
weight vectors and loss given by
loss(w,b) =
1
m
m
∑
i=1
log(1+ exp(−yi(wT xi+b))) (3)
where m is the size of the training set of images xi with
associated labels yi.
The choice of λ has a significant effect in the perfor-
mance of the algorithm and depends on the size of
the training set. In our implementation, using a train-
ing set of 1000 images we found experimentally that
λ = 0.25 gives good results. Figure 2 (top) shows the
ROC curves of the liveness test for several values of λ .
3.1 Experimental design
We used the NUAA Photograph Imposter Database,
which contains grayscale images of 15 different sub-
jects in various poses under different illumination con-
ditions. The images are organized into the two cate-
gories: the client images which are images of live faces,
and the imposter images which are images of photos of
the subjects. The size of all images is 64×64 pixels.
Our training dataset consisted of 1000 client and im-
poster images. The test set consisted of several subsets,
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Figure 1: Test images. From left to right: (i) client, (ii) imposter, (iii) sharpened imposter, (iv) sharpened and
blurred imposter, (v) imposter with salt and pepper noise added to it.
Figure 2: Top: ROC curves for several values of λ .
Bottom: ROC curves for the unaltered imposter images
in test set (ii); the sharpened images in (iii); and the
sharpened blurred images in (vi) with σ = 1.25.
each one containing 105 images, i.e. seven from each
subject. More specifically, we used test sets of:
(i) client images.
(ii) imposter images without any alteration.
(iii) imposter images sharpened by subtracting from
them the response of the Laplacian filter.
(iv) imposter images sharpened with the imsharpen
Matlab function with parameter values 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and
2.0.
(v) the sharpened imposter images in (iii) are blurred
with a Gaussian filter with σ = 0.1, 0.5, 1.25 and 2.0.
(vi) imposter images with 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 amount
of added salt and pepper noise.
Figure 1 shows typical examples of test set images.
4 RESULTS
Figure 2 (bottom) shows the ROC curves of the liveness
test when the imposter test images are either sharpened
by subtracting from them the response of the Laplacian
filter, or first sharpened and then blurred by a Gaus-
sian filter. The performance decreased when the im-
poster images were sharpened even with the very ba-
sic sharpening algorithm we used. The performance
increased when the imposter images were first sharp-
ened and then smoothed, further demonstrating the the
sharpness of the image is a key factor in distinguishing
between client and imposter images.
Next we want to establish that the differences in the
performance of the liveness test are commensurable
with the amount of sharpening and blurring applied on
the imposter images. Figure 3 (left) shows the ROC
curves when the imposter images are sharpened using
the imsharpen Matlab function which subtracts from
the images a blurred version of it. The strength of the
imsharpen command is controlled by a user defined pa-
rameter and we used values of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0.
We notice that larger amounts of sharpening on the im-
poster images result into larger decreases in the perfor-
mance of the liveness test. Similarly, in Figure 3 (mid-
dle) we show the ROC curves when the Laplacian filter
sharpened imposter images are blurred with Gaussian
filters with σ = 0.1, 0.5, 1.25 and 2.0, respectively. We
notice that larger amounts of smoothing result to larger
increases in the performance of the liveness test.
Finally, we experimented with the addition of various
amounts of salt and pepper noise on the imposter im-
ages. This test is relevant in our context since in [10]
it was shown that commercial face recognition systems
can cope with large amounts of salt and pepper noise
and as a consequence they are also vulnerable to im-
poster image attacks even when imposter images con-
tain large amounts of salt and pepper noise. Figure 3
(right) shows the results when salt and pepper noise
with probability 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 was added. We
notice that the addition of noise increases the perfor-
mance of the liveness test and the performance gain is
commensurable with the amount of added noise.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In a real life situation, we should expect that an at-
tacker will process an imposter photo before using it,
increasing their chances of successfully evading a live-
ness test. Motivated by that observation, we evaluated
the resilience of a standard luminance based liveness
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Figure 3: From left to right: ROC curves for the liveness test with different amounts of sharpening, blurring and
salt and pepper noise applied on the imposter images.
test in conjunction with certain image processing oper-
ations of the imposter database. Our results verified and
quantified the assumption that luminance based tests
rely on the different amount of sharpness between im-
ages of live faces and imposter images. In particular,
the sharpening of the imposter images decreased the ac-
curacy of the liveness test while sharpening followed by
smoothing increased accuracy rates.
While we expect that the sharpening of an imposter im-
age before using it for an attack will result into a sharp-
ening of the image acquired by the face recognition sys-
tem, this is an assumption that still has to be verified.
Thus, in the future we plan to simulate and evaluate im-
poster image attacks that use processed images.
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